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Abstract
This paper examines the verification of stability, a control requirement,
over discrete control systems represented as Simulink diagrams, using dif-
ferent model checking approaches and tools. Model checking comprises
the (exhaustive) exploration of a model of a system, to determine if a
requirement is satisfied. If that is not the case, examples of the require-
ment’s violation within the system’s model are provided, as witnesses.
These examples are potentially complementary to previous work on auto-
matic theorem proving, when a system is not proven to be stable, but no
proof of instability can be provided.
We experimentally evaluated the suitability of four model checking
approaches to verify stability on a set of benchmarks including linear and
nonlinear, controlled and uncontrolled, discrete systems, via Lyapunov’s
second method or Lyapunov’s direct method. Our study included sym-
bolic, bounded, statistical and hybrid model checking, through the open-
source tools NuSMV, UCLID, S-TaLiRo and SpaceEx, respectively. Our
experiments and results provide an insight on the strengths and limitations
of these model checking approaches for the verification of control require-
ments for discrete systems at Simulink level. We found that statistical
model checking with S-TaLiRo is the most suitable option to complement
our previous work on automatic theorem proving.
1 INTRODUCTION
The verification of control systems is a timely need, especially for complex au-
tonomous systems interacting with people, such as autonomous cars, or service
robots. Verification processes allow gaining confidence and gathering evidence
that the designed systems work according to functional requirements [1] or that
they are dependable. Requirements are grouped into safety (“nothing bad ever
happens”) or liveness (“something good eventually happens”).
Control systems need to be verified at all phases in the design process from
conceptual ideas to code implementation. Along these phases, different require-
ments need to be considered for verification. Whereas at the initial and mathe-
matical abstract design phases, theoretical control and functional requirements
such as stability or robustness need to be verified, further requirements such as
absence of runtime errors (arrays out of bounds, variable overflows) and floating-
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point issues arise at code implementation, the lowest levels. It is important
to: (a) verify requirements early, at the right level of abstraction and optimal
design-to-implementation phase; and (b) follow a “design and implementation
for verification” philosophy, to facilitate the use of verification techniques and
tools. As control systems differ according to their target systems (e.g., linear,
nonlinear, stochastic, noisy, partially observable), there is a growing need to
understand what existing verification techniques can deliver for the verification
of these systems.
In our work, we have focused on the verification of discrete control systems
modelled at Simulink level from difference equations, assumed to lay in between
a pen-and-paper theoretical design phase, and a code implementation derived
automatically through MATLAB or developed by hand. We look into the use
and combination of well established verification techniques (testing, theorem
proving, model checking), control systems theory, and accomplished and sup-
ported tools, targeting these discrete systems.
Previously, we investigated the combination of two verification techniques,
theorem proving and numerical tests [2,3], to verify control requirements such as
stability in the most automatic manner possible, and “for all possible variable
values and initial conditions”. Theorem proving allows computing a mathemat-
ical proof of the requirements in a symbolic and static manner, i.e., without
running simulations. However, if the theorem proving fails to compute a proof,
no additional information is provided, making debugging difficult. In contrast,
other verification techniques such as model checking and testing provide wit-
nesses or evidence of a violation of the requirements. Nevertheless, both are
computationally expensive, as model checking exhaustively explores a model,
and testing might require a large number of simulations to achieve an accept-
able level of coverage of the system.
Transparency in the systems to observe relevant variables and parameters,
and the formulation of the requirement at the right abstraction level (e.g., refer-
ring to elements in a Simulink model) and in a quantifiable manner, if possible,
are paramount in “design for verification”. Hence, control requirements in nat-
ural language, like “stability”, require translation into a metric in terms of a
system’s variables and parameters. The translation process requires specialist
knowledge, such as control systems theory, and a degree of control over the im-
plementation of a Simulink model. In our previous work [2, 3], we made use of
assertions in the form of Simulink blocks, to express the requirements to verify
at the Simulink diagram level. We incorporated Lyapunov functions into the
Simulink diagrams, to assess stability. Although Lyapunov functions can be
computed through well established procedures, more than one might be suit-
able for the same system. Automated verification procedures, such as model
checking or automatic theorem proving, would help to establish, according to
the proposed Lyapunov functions, if a system is stable or that no stability guar-
antees can be provided. The latter can be caused by a proposed function that
does not behave as a Lyapunov function, or if the system is indeed unstable.
Translating the system into a suitable model for model checking is a challenging
task, as some model checking tools only function with finite-state transition or
hybrid models.
In this paper we experimentally investigated the feasibility to verify stabil-
ity for discrete systems using model checking. Model checking has diversified
to handle systems with many states and continuous components (e.g., hybrid
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systems). We set out to compare four different model checking approaches in a
systematic manner. Additionally, we sought to find out whether model checking
can complement previously proposed theorem proving methodologies, such as
the ones proposed in [2,3], by providing evidence of requirement satisfaction or
violation in the form of witnesses.
Our study included state-of-the-art symbolic [4], bounded (BMC) [4], sta-
tistical (sampling-based) [5] and hybrid [6] model checking approaches, through
representative tools (model checkers): NuSMV1, UCLID2, S-TaLiRo3, and SpaceEx4,
respectively. These tools were chosen due to their announced compatibility with
Simulink, where applicable; also, they are well maintained and user friendly. We
determined the advantages and limitations of each one of these model checking
approaches, with respect to the verification of stability requirements for linear
scalar, linear multi-variable and nonlinear multi-variable discrete systems, all
modelled as Simulink diagrams with basic blocks. Applied quantitative and
qualitative performance criteria comprised: correctness of the translation se-
mantics from Simulink to the input language of the model checker, time to
pre-process a model into a suitable representation (if needed), time to check a
requirement, and amount of additional user analysis to specify checking param-
eters such as simulation time or loop iterations.
As in our previous work, we incorporated Lyapunov functions into the Simulink
diagrams, formulating the Temporal Logic properties [4] to verify through model
checking in terms of Lyapunov functions and their characteristics. For the lin-
ear systems, we employed Lyapunov’s second method to determine stability, as
in [3]; for the nonlinear system, we employed Lyapunov’s direct method. We
encoded suitable models for verification into the input languages of the model
checkers, based on existent translation semantics. In the models, we attempted
to balance the number of states in the models on one hand, to avoid a state-
space explosion, and expressing the continuity of the state-space of the discrete
systems on the other.
The paper proceeds with an overview of related work on verification of
Simulink diagrams, and verification of the stability control requirement in Sec-
tion 2. We then present different case studies used as benchmarks (Section 3),
followed by a brief introduction of the main features of the model checking tools
(Section 4) that were employed to verify stability in each case study. Section 5
presents the comparative results of the verification experiments. Section 6 con-
cludes the paper and gives and outlook towards future work.
2 RELATED WORK
Verification techniques include testing, model checking and theorem proving. In
practice, combinations of these techniques are used to verify complex real-life
systems, departing from the “one technique fits all” paradigm. The presence of
signals and parameters theoretically in the domain of the real numbers, corre-
sponding to a continuous real world, leads to state-space explosion problems in
the computational mechanisms of some of these techniques.
1http://nusmv.fbk.eu/
2http://uclid.eecs.berkeley.edu/
3https://sites.google.com/a/asu.edu/s-taliro/s-taliro
4http://spaceex.imag.fr/
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In testing, inputs are applied to a system to stimulate actions and reac-
tions, and outputs are observed to determine if the requirements are satisfied.
The selection of inputs (test cases) needs to thoroughly explore the system’s
state space, whilst targeting its interesting regions (i.e., “covering” the system).
Simulink is an ideal tool for testing models of control systems in simulation. Test
generation systematically samples the state space of variables and parameters,
e.g., through automated search [7].
Theorem proving or deductive verification [4] is a static verification tech-
nique that involves finding a mathematical proof of a requirement, through the
application of axioms, lemmas and inference rules. A proof can be computed
automatically via Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solvers or Satisfiability
(SAT) solvers, or interactively (with user guidance), which requires a great
degree of domain knowledge and expertise. A description of the system and
requirements in Propositional, First-Order or Higher-Order Logic is required,
along with any other relevant mathematical theory (e.g., sets, linear algebra).
These definitions and additional information are normally encoded by hand into
“theories”, as required by case studies; they can be reused once embedded in the
theorem proving tools. Theorem proving has been employed to verify functional
equivalence between Simulink diagrams and auto-generated code (e.g., [8]), for
data type checks (e.g., [9]) and to verify high-level requirements including sta-
bility (e.g., [10]).
Model checking is the exhaustive traversal of a finite-state model of a system
(i.e., all the states and state transitions in the model are explored) to check for
requirements defined as properties in a variety of different Temporal Logics [4].
Hence, most model checking variants require a discrete or hybrid model that
is decidable. If a property is found to be false, a counterexample is returned,
comprising a sequence of states or a trace (according to the valid state transitions
in the model). Computing a decidable model and reducing the state-space to
avoid state-space explosion issues, have motivated the shift from explicit-state
model checking, i.e., enumerating and traversing all possible states, to symbolic
(grouping states in compacted Binary Decision Diagrams or BDDs), bounded
(exploring up to k transitions in the model) [4], and statistical (sampling the
model’s state space) [5] model checking.
Probabilistic model checking tools [11] suit stochastic models such as Dis-
crete Time Markov Chains. Specialist hybrid model checking tools – for hybrid
models comprising both discrete and continuous transitions, such as switched
systems – make use of geometrical methods to approximate the explored state
space of the continuous transitions [12]. Hybrid model checkers (and other
verification techniques such as theorem proving) commonly restrict the contin-
uous components to ordinary differential equations (ODE) with linear or affine
forms. Reduction of the models can be achieved by systematic abstractions
(e.g., bisimulations), or symmetry reduction techniques.
The absence of runtime errors (or low-level requirements) such as overflows or
arrays out of bounds for fixed data widths, was verified in [13] using model check-
ing for Simulink diagrams. Other tools, such as Mathwork’s Polyspace, translate
the Simulink diagrams into code before checking for runtime errors. Higher-
level requirements in terms of safety and liveness have been verified directly in
the Simulink models (e.g., the Prover Plug-In R© or CheckMate for hybrid sys-
tems [12]), after translating the models (or parts of them) into the language of
a specific model checker [11,14], or after translating the Simulink diagrams into
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code [15,16]. Since model checking is based on the exploration of finite-state de-
cidable models, which implies discretization and abstraction processes over the
original systems, formalized “translation” processes are highly desirable. We
explored available translation semantics from Simulink to NuSMV [17] and to
UCLID [13].
The computation of decidable models goes in hand with developing sound
automated translation procedures. This leads to further considerations on the
pros and cons of translating and verifying the Simulink models as code, poten-
tially with runtime issues having been introduced in the process, versus consid-
ering them as mathematical control system models and to verify the absence of
fundamental design flaws before runtime issues are being introduced on the way
to code generation.
Control systems requirements such as stability via Lyapunov methods have
been verified mostly through theorem proving by directly posing the problems in
mathematical terms (e.g., inequalities of region intersections as in [18]) for con-
tinuous systems, or over controllers implemented in code [16], closer to discrete
systems.
From a theoretical control systems perspective, model checking has been
applied, via Lyapunov methods, to verify stability for particular types of con-
tinuous [19] or hybrid systems [20]. For practitioners, however, it is important
to understand whether any model checking approach would be suitable also for
more generic discrete systems, linear and nonlinear. Our paper aims to provide
an insight into this.
3 SYSTEM EXAMPLES
In this paper we verified stability control requirements over Simulink diagrams
through model checking, to evaluate how model checking variants compare and if
they could be used to complement theorem proving by providing witnesses when
no proof can be found. We chose textbook case studies from control systems
theory: linear scalar, linear multi-variable, and non linear multi-variable discrete
systems. The stability requirement was parametrized in terms of the Simulink
diagrams’ components through the application of Lyapunov theory, as proposed
previously in [3], and summarized next.
3.1 Lyapunov’s Second Method
Linear systems have a single equilibrium point, nonlinear systems have multiple
equilibrium points. An equilibrium point is stable if the system’s state trajec-
tories, starting from any initial point close to the equilibrium point, remain
close to it. An equilibrium point is asymptotically stable if it is stable and the
trajectories move towards the equilibrium point as the time t→∞.
A Lyapunov function, V (x(k)) for a discrete system (with variables x(k)) is
a function such that:
• V (x(k)) > 0,∀x(k) 6= 0, and V (x(k)) = 0 if x(k) = 0 (at the equilibrium
point).
• V (x(k))− V (x(k − 1)) < 0,∀x(k) 6= 0, and V (x(k))− V (x(k − 1)) = 0 if
x(k) = 0.
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Figure 1: Linear single-variable system with Lyapunov function
A discrete system is asymptotically stable at the equilibrium point if and
only if there exists a Lyapunov function. For linear and hybrid systems, a
candidate Lyapunov function, with P a positive definite matrix, is
V (x(k)) = x(k)TPx(k). (1)
This function can be computed from solving a relevant Lyapunov’s equation
or a set of equations (for hybrid systems). For a nonlinear system, Lyapunov’s
second method can be applied after linearizing around each one of the equi-
librium points, for all the resulting linear systems. Alternatively, a specific
Lyapunov function can be proposed (Lyapunov’s direct method).
Although we can compute single Lyapunov functions given established proce-
dures, we can propose other Lyapunov functions that might be compatible with
the system. Furthermore, the translation of the system for which we designed
the Lyapunov functions, from pen-and-paper into a Simulink diagram (or code),
might be incorrect. Thus, automated procedures to verify stability are greatly
desirable, to help ensure that the designs satisfy their control requirements.
3.2 Linear Time Invariant Discrete Systems
Three discrete systems were chosen: two simple uncontrolled loops, and a con-
trolled system. We proposed suitable Lyapunov functions for each system, to
facilitate the verification of stability.
Multiplication loop Inspired by the example in [13], shown in Fig. 1 and
defined as
x(k + 1) = ax(k). (2)
A Lyapunov function for this system is
V (x) = x2. (3)
Multi-variable loop Example from [2], shown in Fig. 2, and defined as
x(k + 1) = Ax(k). (4)
A Lyapunov function was proposed according to (1), with P = I.
6
Figure 2: Linear multi-variable system with Lyapunov function
Figure 3: Controlled linear multi-variable system with Lyapunov function
Multi-variable controlled system Example from [3], shown in Fig. 3. In
state-space equation form, defined as
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + Bu(k), (5)
with matrices
A =
[
1.5 0.5
0.5 1
]
, B =
[
2
0
]
,
and a feedback controller for stability,
u(k) = −Kx(k), K = [ 1.15 0.57 ] , (6)
by pole placement with desired poles [0.8, 0.3; 0 − 0.6]. A Lyapunov function
was proposed according to (1), computed from a Lyapunov’s discrete equation,
(A−BK)TP(A−BK)−P = −I, (7)
P =
[
2.26 1.50
1.50 4.06
]
.
These systems represent infinite loops computationally. If the systems are
stable, fixpoints can be derived for the system variables, in the equilibrium
points. If the systems are unstable, the system variables will grow without
bounds, a challenge for automated verification tools such as model checking, in
terms of state-space explosion, data representation (overflows) and decidability
(procedures to exhaustively explore a system’s model might not terminate).
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Figure 4: Nonlinear multi-variable system with Lyapunov function
3.3 Nonlinear Discrete System
The selected nonlinear discrete system is shown in Fig. 4, defined as
x1(k + 1) =
x2(k)
1 + x22(k)
x2(k + 1) =
x1(k)
1 + x22(k)
. (8)
A Lyapunov function was proposed,
V (x(k)) = x21(k) + x
2
2(k), (9)
with the difference
V (x(k))− V (x(k − 1)) = V (x(k))
[
1
[1 + x22(k)]
2
− 1
]
≤ 0.
Computationally, nonlinear system loops employ arithmetic operations that
might lead to errors, such as divisions by zero, in automated verification pro-
cesses. This is added to the aforementioned state-space explosion issues.
4 SELECTED MODEL CHECKING TOOLS
Specific model checking tools, corresponding to different model checking ap-
proaches, were chosen following the criteria of: (a) widespread usage within the
verification community; (b) good support, to ensure fully functioning tools and,
thus, high productivity; (c) user friendliness, providing guides and examples;
and (d) previous application for the verification of Simulink diagrams.
4.1 NuSMV
NuSMV, a symbolic model checker, was originally developed for the verifica-
tion of hardware designs. A finite-state machine (FSM) describes the model,
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in terms of states and their transitions. The transition model is transformed
into a Boolean function, which is encoded into a BDD, a data structure devel-
oped for compressed Boolean function representations [4]. Consequently, the
encoded BDD structures are not efficient if the transitions are dictated by com-
plex arithmetic operations, such as a series of multiplications in a control system
loop.
The requirements to verify can be encoded into Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
or Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [4]. Also, NuSMV can perform BMC, by
specifying a maximum number of transitions to explore in the model.
NuSMV’s syntax includes signed and unsigned bit-vectors, and matrix data
types (arrays of arrays of bit-vectors). Translation semantics from Simulink to
NuSMV have been proposed in [17].
4.2 UCLID
UCLID was also originally developed for the verification of hardware designs.
Its syntax is similar to NuSMV’s, although it does not include matrix data
types and the arithmetic operations have a more limited functionality (e.g., the
division operation only allows integers to the power of 2 as denominators). The
models have a FSM form, but they are not encoded as BDDs.
UCLID performs BMC, by “simulating” the FSM for a specified number
of transitions, and checking a specified logical-mathematical expression at each
step or once all steps have finished.
Translation semantics from Simulink to UCLID have been proposed in [13].
4.3 S-Taliro
S-TaLiRo is categorized within statistical model checking, since sample traces
or state sequences are extracted from the model to determine if a Metric Tem-
poral Logic (MTL) property is true or false in all these samples [5]. Its goal is
finding (sequences of) inputs in a Simulink diagram that satisfy (or falsify) a
requirement in terms of outputs in the diagram, or the verification of the re-
quirement according to a range of initial system parameters (e.g., initial states
x(0)). Furthermore, S-TaLiRo provides a metric on how well a sample trace
(system trajectory) satisfies the property, denominated “robustness”. Hence,
exploration methods looking for inputs that provide the best robustness value,
can be applied in an automated manner, e.g., simulated annealing, cross-entropy,
genetic algorithms and uniform random sampling.
S-TaLiRo operates directly in MATLAB/Simulink, and numerous examples
verifying performance requirements for complex control systems are provided.
4.4 SpaceEx
SpaceEx specializes in analysis of hybrid systems with piecewise affine, non-
deterministic dynamics, through computationally efficient reachability algorithms
for the continuous transitions of the hybrid systems. In particular, SpaceEx
computes “flowpipe” approximations of sets of reachable states. The hybrid
system models to verify are constructed through a graphic interface, and saved
in an xml format.
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The restrictions on the continuous components of the hybrid systems, to
piecewise affine dynamics, is shared by other tools for hybrid systems, such
as the CheckMate model checker, and the theorem prover Keymaera [12, 18].
Consequently, we hypothesised that this tool, and other similar ones, would not
be suitable to model and consequently verify the stability requirements of the
discrete systems in Section 3.
5 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
For each system described in Section 3, a model in the model checker’s input
language was developed and its verification attempted. All models are available
online5 together with the results obtained. For all the linear systems, stable
and unstable system parameters were applied to assess the correctness of the
verification results.
We evaluated the different model checking approaches according to the fol-
lowing criteria: (a) time to pre-process a model into a BDD representation,
which is a critical aspect for symbolic model-checking; (b) total checking time,
i.e., time used to verify a requirement; (c) amount of additional user input to
specify parameters such as initial values, simulation time or loop iterations; and
(d) correctness of the translation semantics from Simulink to the input language
of the model checker, if translation is necessary.
5.1 Experiments in NuSMV
FSMs were developed manually, according to the semantics proposed in [17], for
NuSMV version 2.4.1. On each FSM, the state variables transition sequentially
according to each one of the operation blocks in the Simulink diagram, starting
from the delay. The state variables in the model were represented by 8 bits,
to reduce the state space at the cost of inaccuracy and representation. We
adjusted the basic operations to represent basic floating point numbers, also at
great accuracy cost.
In the verification stage, initial parameters of x = 2, x = [1; 1] were applied
for the scalar and matrix systems, respectively, signifying the verification of
stability only for a single system’s trajectory. For the first two scalar and matrix
loops, parameters a = {0.9, 1.9} and A = {[0.5 0; 0 0.5], [1.5 0; 0 1.5]}
were used for the stable and unstable versions. K = [10.1, 6] was employed for
the unstable controlled system. No unstable version of the nonlinear system was
verified. An LTL formula specified the stability requirement, over the Lyapunov
function’s difference, G delay_lyap_output >= lyap_output.
Results are shown in Table 1, where YES denotes the compilation and the
verification taking place, and NO denotes the failure to compile in less than two
hours. T indicates the property is true, and F the property is false. Where the
model compilation process succeeded, the size of the state space is indicated.
Time to pre-process a model into a BDD The results in Table 1 show the
impressive size of the state-space, for relatively “simple systems”, even with the
reduced bit-vector size. NuSMV struggled to compute BDDs for systems that
5https://github.com/riveras/model_checking
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Table 1: Experiments in NuSMV
EXAMPLE STABLE SYSTEM UNSTABLE SYSTEM
Comp.? Verif.? Comp.? Verif.?
Scalar loop YES 2120 YES: T YES 2120 YES: F
Matrix loop YES 2160 YES: T NO – NO
Controller NO – NO NO – NO
Nonlinear YES 2176 YES: T – – –
loop continuously without a fixpoint, such as the one of the unstable matrix
linear system, within a reasonable time threshold. Consequently, verification
cannot take place. This state-space explosion for unstable and the controlled
loop is caused by the variables overflowing, as no related flags or added con-
straints were implemented to stop the infinite loops.
Verification time The main overhead was caused by the building of the
models into BDDs. When models were built, the verification time was less than
one hour, although counterexamples took longer to compute when the property
was found to be false.
Parameters to specify Ideally, as many initial state conditions as possible
should be verified (i.e. “all possible states”), representing different system tra-
jectories. This process can be automated through scripting to control the models
and NuSMV, although the chosen initial conditions will always be constrained
by the bit-vector size. Nevertheless, this “sampling” of the initial conditions is
not exhaustive over the state space.
Correctness of the translation semantics The semantics in [17] do not
specify how to deal with floating-point operations and non-integer data, these
are at the core of the semantics of Simulink. The provided arithmetic oper-
ations in NuSMV are not equivalent to the floating-point ones in Simulink.
Furthermore, their semantics offer no guidance on how to correctly represent
the functionality of a loop that increases continuously, as the bit-vectors would
overflow without any implemented constraints.
Overall, this approach is more suited to verify control systems at code imple-
mentation level, as proposed in [13], providing adequate semantics (e.g., floating-
point) and system loop constraints (to avoid overflows when variables reach their
limits) are added, to emulate the system loop properties more closely within
fixed width data types. Nonetheless, the state-space sizes in the computation
of BDDs are still an obstacle.
5.2 Experiments in UCLID
We manually adjusted the FSM models developed for NuSMV, according to
UCLID’s syntax. Following the semantics in [13], a transition in the FSM is an
unrolling of the whole system loop, going through all the serial block operations
in the Simulink diagrams at once. The arithmetic division operation in the
11
Table 2: Experiments in UCLID
EXAMPLE STABLE SYSTEM UNSTABLE SYSTEM
k bound 10 20 40 80 10 20 40 80
Scalar loop T T T T F F F F
Matrix loop T T T T F F F F
Controller F F F F F F F F
Nonlinear T T T T – – – –
nonlinear system was approximated to 0, as the provided operators do not allow
divisions with variable denominators as in NuSMV. We ran UCLID version 3.1,
in a Fedora 6 Virtual Machine.
In the verification stage, the parameters for the stable and unstable systems
were a = {0.9, 12.9} for the scalar loop, A = {[0.5 0; 0 0.5], [13.5 0; 0 13.5]}
for the matrix loop, and K = [11, 6] for the unstable controlled system. The
same initial values of NuSMV were used for the state variables, and a bit-vector
size of 16 for all variables. Iteration bounds of k = {10, 20, 40, 80} were ex-
plored, i.e., the models were unrolled up to 80 times from the specified initial
states. We verified the requirement through the computation of the expression
comparison := lyap.output <= delay2.output at each exploration step (“simu-
lation”) of the model.
Table 2 shows the results when checking the expression, for the different k
bounds. F indicates the expression was not true in at least one of the checks,
and T indicates the expression was always true.
Verification time The verification process took seconds, as the models are
unrolled iteratively according to the specified steps on-the-fly. Unfortunately,
no counterexamples were provided when the expression checks failed.
Parameters to specify We specified initial values, as for NuSMV, and bounds
on the number of exploration steps. It is not clear how to chose a suitable num-
ber of steps. However, this information is critical for verification since too small
a number may lead to false positives if the expressions failed (i.e. are falsified)
in the future. Additionally, the expression checks at each execution step have
to be encoded by hand explicitly, whereas in other model checkers this is done
automatically by indicating a property to check.
Correctness of the translation semantics As in NuSMV, the semantics
in [13] do not consider floating-point operations, nor overflows. The impact
of the lack of floating point built-in support is evident in the controlled sys-
tem, where high precision multiplication operations are needed for an accurate
computation of the requirement’s expression value. Furthermore, the available
arithmetic operations have limited functionality and there is no matrix data
type, compared to NuSMV.
This approach is computationally less expensive than using NuSMV, allow-
ing larger bit-vector sizes, although more limited in terms of arithmetic oper-
ations and data representation. Extending the operational functionalities and
12
Table 3: Experiments in S-TaLiRo
EXAMPLE STABLE SYSTEM UNSTABLE SYSTEM
Sampling SA CE UR SA CE UR
Scalar loop T – T F F F
Matrix loop T – T F F F
Controller T – T F F F
Nonlinear T – T – – –
implementing some overflow constraints, this approach would be more suit-
able to the verification of control systems code, by exploring the loops for k
iterations, for both high-level functional and runtime requirements. Pre- and
post-conditions to avoid overflows and underflows would enable sound verifica-
tion “for all possible representable values” of variables in a system loop, within
bounded ranges and a fixed bit-vector widths.
5.3 Experiments in S-TaLiRo
For these experiments, we modified the Simulink diagrams presented in Sec-
tion 3 by adding output probes to measure the Lyapunov function’s difference
over time, as required by the tool, S-TaLiRo version 1.61, running in MAT-
LAB/Simulink version R2013a.
For verification, ranges of x = [−10 10] and x = [−10 10;−10 10] were
specified for the initial state variable values, to be sampled by the tool. We used
the same parameters for a and A in the linear systems as in the NuSMV exper-
iments, and an unstable controller of −K. The MTL properties to falsify were,
for stable systems, “the Lyapunov function’s difference is eventually > 0”; and,
for unstable systems, “the Lyapunov function’s difference is always <= 0”. We
allowed 100 tests for different input samples, for three of the offered exploration
methods to find traces that falsify the properties: simulated annealing (SA),
cross-entropy (CE), and uniform random (UR). The cross-entropy method did
not run successfully for the stable systems. The experiment configuration set-
tings, initial or input value ranges, and MTL properties and exploration methods
were specified via MATLAB scripts.
The results are shown in Table 3, where T indicates a falsifying trace was
not found (the system might not be unstable), and F indicates a falsifying trace
was found (the system is unstable).
Verification time The verification process took less than a minute in total,
for the specified number of samples and diagram simulation time per sample.
This time is expected to increase if more samples and larger value ranges are
introduced.
Parameters to specify S-TaLiRo requires specifying either ranges for the
initial values of the state variables, or ranges for the inputs (if any), the number
of samples, the simulation time per run (sample), and the exploration method,
to mention some of the most important parameters. Some of these parameters
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can be intuitively tuned, but others depend more on understanding of the tool’s
functionality and previous knowledge.
Correctness of the translation semantics The “translation” process from
our Simulink diagrams involves adding input and output block probes, to in-
dicate which are the input signals to sample, and which are the output signals
that the property to verify refers to.
Overall, this approach is the most straightforward to use over our Simulink
diagrams, since no translation is needed, and the amount of additional speci-
fiable parameters is reduced. Additionally, S-TaLiRo allowed to cover more of
the possible initial state variable values in an automated manner, compared
to having to change the initial values manually in the models used in UCLID
and NuSMV. Nevertheless, this approach is not complete for the verification of
stability in general, since it does not offer a proof in the case a system is stable
– i.e., the results for the MTL property of “eventually unstable” for a stable
system only indicate that the system is not unstable within the sampled initial
state values and simulated time. Alternatively, it could be the case that the
requirement of “always stable” is not falsified in unstable systems, if the initial
state values and simulation time interval are of a trajectory that appears to
converge to an equilibrium point.
Statistical model checking through S-TaLiRo allows the verification of all
types of systems (e.g., continuous, discrete, linear, nonlinear, stochastic and
delayed) as long as they are modelled in Simulink. Although, this approach
cannot substitute the strength of computing a proof of a requirement “for all
possible variable values and initial states”, from theorem proving (e.g., in [3]), it
is suitable as a method to search for evidence that a requirement is not satisfied.
5.4 Experiments in SpaceEx
We attempted to construct models for the systems in Section 3, but the syntax
did not allow expressing difference equations and nonlinear terms, including the
Lyapunov functions. In contrast, continuous systems similar to the discrete
ones, such as
x˙ = −0.5x,
were easily constructed. Stability can only be verified, for continuous or hybrid
systems, through computing the reachability of the models, given initial state
conditions, x(0), specified as single values or intervals. If the system is stable,
the system’s reachability is bounded by these initial conditions, and the system
converges (reaches a fixpoint) to the equilibrium point in x = 0. If the system
is unstable, the system’s state variables diverge and no fixpoint is reached. The
same concepts extend to multi-variable linear continuous systems.
SpaceEx has the potential to be extended to include discrete systems and
their respective “flowpipe” algorithms, once developed.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We explored the verification of stability for discrete systems’ designs in Simulink,
through different model checking variants and corresponding state-of-the-art
tools. We aimed to find how well these different model checking variants are
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suited to this particular problem domain, how compatible they are with respect
to Simulink diagrams as a system modelling language, what are their limitations
in practice, and if any of them would substitute or complement our previously
developed theorem proving approach [3], by providing examples as evidence of
requirement violation.
We explored four model checking variants through related tools, symbolic,
bounded, statistical and hybrid, verifying stability based on Lyapunov methods
for discrete linear and nonlinear systems. Our experiments and results provide
an insight on the strengths and limitations of these model checking approaches
with respect to the verification of stability of discrete systems.
We found that statistical model checking through S-TaLiRo is the most suit-
able option to complement our previous work on automatic theorem proving.
This same approach is the most compatible with Simulink diagrams of systems
described as difference equations, compared to symbolic model checking with
NuSMV or bounded model checking with UCLID – based on available trans-
lation semantics from Simulink to NuSMV and UCLID–, and hybrid model
checking with SpaceEx.
In the future, we will incorporate model checking into our automatic theorem
proving methodology [3]. This will allow us to return evidence as proof (in the
form of counterexamples) when the systems are not stable or do not satisfy
other control or performance requirements, thus enhancing the usability of the
approach and facilitating debug. Our evaluation shows that S-TaLiRo is the
ideal candidate for this extension.
Instead of developing individual tools to verify the same requirement over
different types of systems, software platforms could be extended to recognize
the system’s characteristics and apply relevant algorithmic variants, according
to sound theoretical frameworks. MATLAB/Simulink could be used as platform
to encode standardized models (i.e., through the same graphical language), con-
nected to theorem provers, external constraint, satisfiability and optimization
solvers.
The computation of Lyapunov functions for all kinds of systems remains a
research challenge. A plausible alternative is to further explore model check-
ing related computational techniques, such as reachability approximations or
BMC combined with SMT solvers as in [19], to find “stable” regions of the
state space [21], or regions that satisfy other performance requirements. Other
alternatives point towards the use of statistical model checking or sampling and
search methods as in S-TaLiRo, combined with optimization problems, to com-
pute Lypaunov functions and barrier certificates [20] for larger sets of types of
systems. We will be exploring such alternatives in the future.
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